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This article adds to the refinement of the concept of party institutionalization by focusing on 
its multilevel character, capturing possible variation between the institutionalization of the 
party elite and a party’s base. Hence, we argue that debates around party institutionalization 
as an analytical concept can profit from clarifying whose behavior we actually theorize when 
specifying and operationalizing the concept’s various dimensions. We illustrate this by 
focusing on different configurations of the internal property of routinization, more 
specifically, the presence or absence of elite-level and of base-level routinization. We 
hypothesize that distinct combinations influence whether and to which extent a party’s overall 
organization can be considered routinized or not, which, in turn, affects intra-organizational 
dynamics. We illustrate the usefulness of our conceptual distinctions using comparative case 
studies of parties characterized by either elite-level or base-level routinization – from both 
established and new democracies – to illustrate each dimension’s distinct implications for 
patterns of intra-party conflict and stability. 
 





From its inception onwards, party institutionalization as a concept was crucially shaped by the 
mass party model of party organization initially developed in Western Europe (Panebianco 
1988). By now the concept has successfully travelled to different world regions like Central 
Eastern Europe or Latin America (e.g. Tavits 2013; Mainwaring and Scully 1995) and in the 
course of doing so has been increasingly refined. Important clarifications have been made 
regarding its multidimensionality. According to Levitsky (1998) as well as Randall and 
Svåsand (2002), party institutionalization – a party’s development towards consolidation – 
becomes manifest in two qualitatively distinct internal properties: routinization, a structural 
dimension which refers to rule-guided processes within the organization and value infusion, 
an attitudinal dimension which refers to party actors’ emotional attachment to their party.1 
Importantly, these two qualitatively distinct phenomena neither necessarily coincide, nor are 
driven by the same systemic or party level characteristics (Bolleyer and Ruth 2018).  
We would like to add to the refinement of this concept by focusing on its multilevel 
character by arguing that debates around the concept of party institutionalization can profit 
from clarifying whose behavior – of party elite or membership base – we actually theorize 
when specifying and operationalizing the concept’s various dimensions. We will illustrate 
this by focusing on the intra-organizational property of routinization. While routinization can 
be generally defined as rule-guided behavior of party actors within a party organization, we 
conceptually distinguish the routinization on the level of the party elite from the 
routinization of the party base, both of which affect to which extent and how a party 
organization will routinize overall.2 A focus on routinization has several advantages. 
Routinization as rule-guided behavior is not equivalent but closely associated with the nature 
of organizational structures. A conceptualization in terms of how some types of rules are 
central to the routinization of elites, while others shape the routinization of the party base 
allows for an empirical mapping of party organizations representing different constellations 
of multilevel routinization distinguished in the following. Hence, while party 
institutionalization “is not identical with the party’s development in purely organisational 
terms” (Randall and Svåsand 2002, 12), structures and practices party elites decide to invest 
                                                          
1 A party’s autonomy from its environment, a third dimension Panebianco (1988) considered as important – 
which Randall and Svåsand (2002, 13) classified as the ‘external dimension’ of party institutionalization (see 
also the “external” or “perceptual institutionalization” Harmel et al 2018) – is not considered here, due to the 
focus on internal party dynamics (Casal Bértoa 2017). 
2 Conceptualizing party institutionalization from a multilevel perspective builds on the growing literature on 
multilevel party organization and party organization in multilevel systems that stress the need to distinguish  and 
assess the relationship between different layers within a party organization that operate on different levels (e.g. 
Thorlakson 2009; Swenden and Toubeau 2013; Bolleyer et al 2014). 
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in can be either conducive or detrimental to institutionalized relationships between party 
actors and their party (Panebianco 1988, 53-65; Bolleyer and Ruth 2018). While 
conceptually discrepancies between elite- and base-level value infusion can be specified in 
the same fashion as they can regarding to routinization, lacking comparable measures of elite 
and party base orientations and attachments within and across parties, cross-regional 
comparisons are seriously curtailed.3 At the same time, patterns of routinization are bound to 
have important repercussions for party organizational stability – elite-level routinization 
particularly within and base-level routinization particularly outside public institutions.  
After developing the distinction between elite- and base-level routinization, we 
identify four analytical configurations of multi-level routinization, each of which has 
implications for a party organization’s overall routinization and intra-organizational patterns 
of conflict and stability. To illustrate this, we present case studies for the two configurations 
of parties that are either elite- or base-level routinized, covering both parties in old and new 
democracies. Based on this assessment we aim at showing the usefulness of disentangling the 
routinization of party elites from the routinization of the party base when studying similarities 
and differences of party organization within and across regions.  
 
2. Conceptualizing Multi-level Routinization 
To conceive of party institutionalization as a multilevel concept sheds light on whose 
behavior we focus on when we theorize particular dimensions of the concept (here: 
routinization). Therefore, we distinguish between two groups of actors within political parties 
that constitute two fundamental layers of a party organization: the central party elites defined 
as those actors that make up a party’s national leadership, both in central office and (national) 
public office and the party base defined as a party’s formal members as well as active 
supporters (Michels 1962; Katz and Mair 1993) that depending on the nature of the 
organization (that can have more or less fluid boundaries) and the political system (that can be 
unitary or federal) can take on roles on subnational levels or not, thereby embracing rank-and-
                                                          
3 Some authors have used different types of survey data on party identification or brands to approximate this 
dimension of party institutionalization on the base-level (e.g. Bolleyer and Ruth 2018; Lupu 2013). Cross-
regionally comparable measures on elite-level value infusion are even harder to find. Especially in new 
democracies this dimension of party institutionalization is still an understudied topic. Therefore, for the purpose 
of this study we focus on the dimension of routinization, exclusively, to introduce our multilevel 
conceptualization of party institutionalization, and leave the expansion of this conceptualization to the dimension 
of value infusion as a task for the future. 
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file, on the one hand, and activists and lower-level officials, on the other (Ponce and Scarrow 
2016; Scarrow and Gezgor 2010).4 
Since the concept of party institutionalization has been developed using the mass party 
model as a template, traditional research on party institutionalization tends to assume that the 
routinization of the party base goes hand in hand with the routinization of party elites 
(Panebianco 1988). More specifically, base-level routinization is assumed to have 
implications for elite routinization, as elites are recruited from or by the same party base 
(Panebianco 1988; Katz and Mair 1995). Yet various studies have indicated that outsider 
recruitment can co-exist with a routinized party base (Kitschelt 1994; Levitsky 1998; Wills-
Otero 2009), suggesting that traditional party models need to be systematically 
‘disaggregated’.  
Once doing so it becomes clear that the routinization of the party base – or base-level 
routinization – does not necessarily impose constraints on leadership behavior (Wills-Otero 
2009; Scarrow, Webb, and Farrell 2001). This might be the case, for instance, because the 
party elite renews itself through outsider recruitment for high party positions, putting people 
in charge who are not socialized into the organization as followers (hence do not form part of 
the party base) and who therefore might willingly bypass party rules (Levitsky 1998, 82-83; 
Burgess and Levitsky 2003). At the same time, whether central elites are themselves 
routinized or not is not necessarily a determinant of whether they invest in a routinized party 
base, incentivized, for instance, by the availability of public resources or the presence of ties 
to societal groups (Bolleyer and Ruth 2018). This highlights the need to keep elite-level and 
base-level routinization separate to capture the nature of parties as complex organizations 
(Wills-Otero 2014, 2; Panebianco 1988), which applies to party development not only in new 
democracies but also in old democracies where institutionalization patterns have been found 
much more complex than suggested by the mass party model (e.g. de Lange and Art 2011; 
Bolleyer 2013; Levitsky, Loxton, and Van Dyck 2016). 
 
 
                                                          
4 Our distinction coincides to some extent with the three faces of party as specified by Katz and Mair - the party 
in central office, in public office and the party membership base (1993: 594-5). However, this ‘trias’ was less 
concerned by the ‘vertical’ dimension of party organization. For instance, the position of regional office-holders 
is not explicitly specified (they are not part of the ‘national leadership’ (central office) but they are not 
‘members’ and ‘activitists’ either). At the same time, as the party in public and central office tend to overlap on 
the national level, in our conceptualization of party elite vs. party base these two units are considered as forming 
part of the national party elite.  
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2.1 Defining Base-Level and Elite-level Routinization 
We distinguish base-level routinization from elite level routinization in the following way: 
Base-level routinization takes place when the behavior of rank-and-file, subnational activists 
and subnational party officials and representatives – actors constitutive of the party base – 
becomes more rule-guided and regularized. This becomes visible in an increasingly elaborate 
and stable infrastructure (Panebianco 1988, 49, 53), conducive to organizational rules 
becoming “perceived as permanent structures” (Levitsky 1998, 81) and to parties as structures 
being increasingly dense, regularized and thus able to guide party actors’ behavior (Janda 
1980). Importantly, the presence of permanent structures as a factor conducive to base-level 
routinization is not equivalent to the creation of formal party branches in the traditional 
(Western European) sense. It equally can be assured by networks of local intermediaries 
(Freidenberg and Levitsky 2006; Kitschelt and Kselman 2010). In this sense, permanence 
does not presuppose one particular ‘organizational form’ but refers to structures (be those 
formal or informal) which guide party actors’ behavior who interact within them and thereby 
create continuity between elections. These structures support base-level routinization because 
formal party branches as well as informal networks incorporate members and followers into 
the party (Freidenberg and Levitsky 2006; Kitschelt and Kselman 2010, 13-14). They provide 
channels for communication between the national party elites and grassroots (Levitsky 2001, 
54-56; Tavits 2012, 85-86), with party officials forming part of these structures who 
“establish routines and standard operating procedures” (Kitschelt 1994, 222), familiarizing 
followers with rules and procedures that govern the internal life of a party.5 
Elite-level routinization, in contrast, is defined as rule constraints on the ‘upper layer’ 
of the organization, the national party elite, in the area of leadership renewal, which is 
fundamental to a party’s ability to outlive its founders and to a party’s ability to assure 
organizational continuity in the face of changing personnel (Janda 1980; Burgess and 
Levitsky 2003). Which national leaders are selected and how, whether this process is rule-
guided or not, has important implications for whether those selected as leaders are likely to 
follow party rules also in other domains once exercising their role (Cross and Blais 2012; 
Scarrow, Webb, and Farrell 2001; Bolleyer 2013). To bind national elites to leadership 
selection rules these constraints need to be exercised by parts of the organization other than 
the central elite itself. This can be rank-and-file party members, activists or subnational 
officials (all forming part of the party base) that are external to the central circles of power.  
                                                          
5 Some new parties such as the Party for Freedom in the Netherlands deliberately did not build up a membership 
base (e.g. de Lange and Art 2011), base-level routinization in such cases is, by definition, absent. 
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Importantly, elite-level routinization thus does not presuppose particular types of 
‘democratic’ party rules (see on these distinctions Wills-Otero 2009, 2014) or constraints on 
leaders through the ‘formal institutionalization of internal participation and contestation at all 
levels of the party’ constituting mechanisms for rank-and-file to hold leaders accountable 
(Samuels 2004, 1010; see on this distinction Wills-Otero 2009, 132-133). Constraints assuring 
elite routinization can be imposed by such structures, but they can be equally generated 
through vertical networks between central and subnational officials and representatives that 
assure the involvement of the latter in processes of central leadership renewal but exclude the 
wider membership (hence can be the result of negotiation rather than of ‘democratic’ one-
man-one-vote procedures). Both are modes that integrate different actors forming part of the 
party base and the central leadership by making the former dependent on the latter. This 
prevents leadership renewal from being a matter of self-selection among central elites 
themselves. Such self-selection indicates the absence of elite-level routinization, as it allows 
leaders to choose their own successors (including outsiders) freely and unbound by party 
rules, without interference from other parts of the party organization.6 Operationally, then, 
elite-level routinization is present when we find intra-organizational integration, defined as 
the presence of structural connections between different layers of the party organization 
(Thorlakson 2009, 159), in our case a stable vertical connection as defined by (formal or 
informal) party rules between central elite level and (some) actors constitutive for the party 
base.  
 
2.2. Mapping Different Combinations of Elite-Level and Base-Level Routinization 
Building on these definitions, the following Table 1 presents four possible configurations 
defined by the presence/absence of elite-level routinization on one axis and the 
presence/absence of base-level routinization on the other. Their distinct combinations 
influence whether and to which extent a party’s overall organization can be considered 
routinized or not. We expect the four different configurations to have different implications 
for a party’s internal patterns of conflict and, with that, relative intra-organizational stability 
defined as the ability to cope with destabilizing events within the organization (e.g. the 
departure of a popular party founder or severe internal conflicts). This is because, as 
suggested earlier, elite-level and base-level routinization ideal-typically reinforce each other, 
                                                          
6 Party research in long-lived democracies has particularly associated this feature with populist and charismatic 
right-wing parties (e.g. Harmel and Svasand 1993; Pedahzur and Brichta 2002) but as our case studies will show, 
this organizational characteristic is more wide-spread.  
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which is not given in the ‘mixed’ configurations that lack one of the two components (see 
shaded quadrants).  
 
Table 1: Configurations of Elite and Base-Level Routinization 
 Base-level routinization  
(rule-guided party base) 
NO base-level routinization 







party base)  
TYPE I 
 
Integrated party with a clearly 
defined party-base  
 
 low levels of internal conflict 
 
 high levels of overall 





Integrated party with an inclusive 
and fluid support base  
 
 vulnerable due to diversity/ 
instability of support base; limited 
ability of national party to assure 
coherence; limited leadership 
predictability 
 
 medium levels of overall 











Autonomous central party elite 
with clearly defined support base 
 
 vulnerable to defections; 
vertical conflicts and base-level 
resistance against leadership 
 
 medium levels of overall 





Party with fluid organization 
composed of autonomous central 
party elite and volatile support 
base 
 
 high levels of internal conflict 
 
 low levels of overall 
organizational routinization and of 
intra-organizational stability 
 
Discussing the implications of the four categories, an organization characterized by both elite- 
and base-level routinization (Type I) resembles the mass party model (upper left-hand corner) 
(e.g. Katz and Mair 1995; Michels 1962) in that there is a structural connection between 
central elites and the party base through the ability of actors constituting that base (e.g. 
members, activists or subnational party office-holders) to influence who runs the party. This 
assures the integration of the overall organization. The presence of a routinized party base 
indicates that the boundaries of the organization (who belongs to it and who does not) are 
clearly demarcated (Katz and Mair 1995; Bolleyer 2009).  
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As in Type I, in Type II the elite level and the party base are integrated, in that the 
party base is involved in central leadership selection. However, that the party base in Type II 
is not routinized (which suggests a much more open, and thus heterogeneous subnational 
layer) has important implications for how elite-level routinization can feed into the overall 
routinization of the organization. The model combining elite- and base-level routinization 
(Type I) can be expected the most internally stable, as the party base being socialized and 
guided in the same party rules is able to act collectively in an effective fashion, selecting a 
leadership with broad support and unifying behind it. In Type II the consequences of the 
presence of a (central) leadership selection mechanism involving the party base are likely to 
be different. Consider such selection mechanism involves the broader membership: Sartori 
(1973: 20) has stressed that democratization denotes the ‘massification’ of politics, which is 
distinct from the meaningful participation of the same masses. More specifically, Lipset et al 
(1956: 12-15) argued that if union members have very little in common and the membership 
is atomized, then the likelihood that groups of members act collectively decreases. More 
recent work on intra-party democracy has stressed that an atomized membership (invited by 
highly inclusive and fluid, hence, non-routinized membership) is more volatile and election 
outcomes can be more easily manipulated by the current leadership (Hazan and Rahat 2010; 
Aylott and Bolin 2017). Vice versa, whatever support signaled by a leaders’ election, this 
support is less stable if the membership is less homogenous and more fluid, lacking a shared 
socialization in party rules and practices. The logic of the argument equally applies to parties 
in which elite-level routinization is assured through dependencies between national and 
lower-level office-holders or a small circle of activists, hence, leaders are selected through 
closed negotiations between the two tiers. The ability of the latter groups to act as a collective 
and the likelihood to agree on a strongly supported leader will be weaker than if the party base 
was routinized. Finally, as argued earlier, even if leaders are selected from the party base 
(hence outside recruitment is avoided), as far as this base is not routinized, the new leaders are 
not socialized into following party rules either, which should make their behavior less 
predictable in the range of organizational domains that they will be operating in. Naturally, an 
extreme case of this configuration is a party that has no party base at all and only consists of a 
central leadership and an altogether undefined following. 
Moving to the second ‘mixed configuration’, Type III defined by only base-level 
routinization, the latter can be actively cultivated by leaders who are highly autonomous 
(hence, not routinized) as (new) party evolution in old and new democracies suggest (e.g. de 
Lange and Art 2011; Bolleyer 2013; Bolleyer and Ruth 2018). While these parties are not 
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vertically integrated, if a routinized party base is incentivized and cultivated by the central 
elite, even though this elite is not routinized itself, the rules in which the party base is 
socialized into is embraced by that elite, assuring – if not structural integration –basic 
coherence between the two levels. The party base can alternatively be routinized bottom-up as 
the cases with movements that transform into parties and start to establish a formal or 
informal party infrastructure on the ground. If those movement parties do not have (yet) a 
clearly identifiable central leadership, the central elite level, by default, cannot be routinized. 
Alternatively, when selection procedures are still weakly defined, prominent figures in the 
movement might, in effect, declare themselves as de facto leaders without the effective formal 
or informal involvement of actors constitutive for the party base. The two scenarios falling in 
Type III are likely to share the following vulnerabilities: top down configurations, depending 
on a party’s ideological orientation, might face problems of resistance coming from the party 
base (whose ability to act collectively is supported by its routinization) when actors are 
dissatisfied with the line the leadership takes for the party and demand stronger involvement 
in who runs the party. Similar discrepancies can occur in bottom-up routinized formations. As 
in both scenarios the elite level (if it exists) is detached from the party base, this makes 
defections likely and the ability of such parties to deal with a leadership vacuum should be 
limited.   
Type IV organizations have neither elite-level nor base-level routinization. This model 
without any routinization captures personal and electoral vehicles that are often ‘flash parties’ 
(Pedersen 1982; Mustillo 2009; Rose and Mackie 1988), as they combine a party base that is 
not socialized into any party rules, is fluid and volatile, with central elite being 
organizationally detached from it. This configuration is most likely to be suffering from 
intense internal conflict and be short-lived as a consequence.  
 
3. Operationalizing Base-level and Elite-level Routinization and Rationale for Case 
Selection 
We capture the routinization of the different types of party actors focusing on the presence 
and relevance of particular types of structures and party rules. As highlighted earlier, we 
consider a party base as routinized if we find formal local branches and, alternatively, 
networks of informal local intermediaries which regulate party life on the regional or local 
level between elections. Levitsky (1998) has stressed the need to distinguish formal from 
informal routinization when studying institutionalization of party organizations in new 
democracies, highlighting that routinization is not equivalent to the creation of formal party 
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branches in the traditional (Western European) sense but can be assured by networks of local 
intermediaries instead (e.g. Freidenberg and Levitsky 2006). Hence, we argue that regular 
exchanges which establish informal links between leaders and followers can be considered as 
rule-based as well. Elite-level routinization becomes manifest in formal or informal leadership 
selection and turnover rules that cannot be changed ad hoc by the current national leadership 
and that do not grant the decision of leader selection predominantly or solely to current 
national office-holders themselves but involve broader membership or non-national officials, 
activists or representatives (see Cross and Blais 2012; Scarrow, Webb, and Farrell 2001).  
 
Based on these operationalizations, we selected four case studies representing the two ‘mixed 
configurations’ (Type II & III in our typology) from Latin America and Western Europe 
respectively. These cases display only one dimension and not the other which means they 
illustrate with most clarity the implication of each, thereby highlighting the usefulness of 
disaggregating the concept along the lines proposed. Meanwhile, to cover for each of these 
mixed configurations parties operating in old and new democracies allowing us to show that 
the implications of the respective party organizational property ‘travel’ these two types of 
regimes, thereby illustrating its cross-regional applicability 
 
4. Comparing mixed types of party routinization in Latin America and Europe 
4.1 Elite-Level Routinization without Base-Level Routinization (Type II) 
4.1.1 Chilean Radical Social Democratic Party 
The Radical Social Democratic Party (PRSD) in Chile is one of the smaller political parties in 
the Chilean party system and the smallest coalition partner within the Concertación – the 
centre-left coalition. Its roots trace back to the Radical Party (Partido Radical) that was 
founded in 1863. To avoid extinction under the binomial electoral system, installed by the 
military government during the democratic transition in the end of the 1980s, the Radical 
Party fused with the Social Democratic Party (PSD) in 1994 into the PRSD (Gayoso 2011, 
126-130; Müller 2008; Siavelis and Field 2015, 44-45). Since then the party held on average 
six delegates in the Chamber of Deputies and one Senator.  
In 2017, the PRSD officially listed approximately 30000 party members.7 Its active 
membership base between elections, however, should be considered by far lower.8 Among the 
                                                          
7 See https://www.servel.cl/estadisticas-nuevas-afiliaciones-y-ratificaciones-a-partidos-politicos/, accessed 
December 1, 2017. 
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requirements to retain their legal status as a political party in Chile the Servicio Electoral de 
Chile (Servel) demands parties to meet a certain number of confirmed inscriptions of party 
members at each legislative election (refichaje) (see Ley No. 18603, Art. 56; Ribera Neumann 
2008). The PRSD usually engages in active membership recruitment along the electoral 
calendar and regularly struggled to meet the criteria to retain its legal status as a political party 
in the past. For example, to meet the required membership ceiling to retain its party status in 
Chile the PRSD used a telephone campaign to attract citizens to register with the party as a 
way of supporting the presidential candidate Alejandro Guillier.9 Hence, the party base of the 
PRSD can be considered rather inclusive and fluid and heavily dependent on the electoral 
cycle – in line with our conceptualization discussed above (see Hazan and Rahat 2010; Aylott 
and Bolin 2017).  
Despite the low routinization of its party base, elite level routinization is indicated by 
the vertical integration of local, regional, and national party organisms of the PRSD in both 
the internal processes of central leadership selection and national candidate selection. 
Concerning the former, according to the party statues the main organism of the central party 
elite is the National Executive Committee (CEN) which consists of 22 members – with the 
party leader at the top (presidente). All of these central elite posts are directly elected every 
three years through the party base, i.e. all active members (see §5, Art. 40-59, Estatutos del 
Partido Radical Socialdemocrata, 2009). Since 1994, the party regularly enabled the party 
base to directly elect its party leaders. Although these internal leadership elections have been 
criticized to be manipulated during the leadership phase of its founder Anselmo Sule (1994-
2002)10, after Sule’s death internal elections have been more regularized, fairly competitive 
and secured the selection of non-outsiders into the central party elite. All party leaders of the 
PRSD since 2002 were either representatives of the PRSD in the Chilean Congress (e.g. José 
Antonio Gómez) or held an extra-parliamentary leadership position within the PRSD party 
organization at the time of their election (e.g. Ernesto Velasco). Although some (acting) party 
leaders have been appointed by the CEN during the lifespan of the party (e.g. Orlando 
Cantuarias), these replacements followed the formal rules of leadership succession set out in 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
8 For example, the internal election of the party leader Jose Antonio Gómez in 2005 registered the participation 
of 9356 votes, in total, of which Gómez obtained 4424, i.e. 53 per cent (see 
http://www.emol.com/noticias/nacional/2005/01/23/170717/jose-antonio-gomez-fue-proclamado-como-
presidente-del-prsd.html, accessed December 1, 2017. 
9 See https://www.df.cl/noticias/economia-y-politica/actualidad/la-desesperada-campana-del-partido-radical-
para-fichar-militantes/2017-03-09/161055.html, accessed December 1, 2017.. 
10 See http://www.emol.com/noticias/nacional/2000/08/31/31238/corte-suprema-no-acoge-peticion-de-prsd.html 
, accessed December 1, 2017; http://www.emol.com/noticias/todas/2001/04/16/52250/ 
consejeros-nacionales-del-prsd-denuncian-falta-de-democracia-interna.html, accessed December 1, 2017. 
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the party statutes in case a former party leader resigns, dies or is incapable of fulfilling his/ 
her duties (see party statutes §5, Art. 55; as well as Müller 2008).  
With respect to the vertical integration within the process of candidate selection a 
more informal logic applies. The behaviour of political party actors and their organizational 
development in post-authoritarian Chile are highly influenced by the binomial electoral 
system instated by the outgoing dictatorship (see Siavelis and Field 2015; Navia 2008). This 
makes incumbent party candidates fairly powerful, due to their personalized ties to voters and 
local networks of activists. Despite the general weakness of base-level routinization, as 
described above, “municipal decentralization and state reforms … limited the capacity of 
partisan organizations to centralize power by maintaining in place hierarchical networks tying 
local, district, and national-level activists” (Luna and Altman 2011, 16). In the case of 
candidate selection within the PRSD the party base is less formally included and candidates 
are not selected via intra-party democratic procedures but rather through a ‘consultative 
process’ of power-sharing between local, regional and national party officials (Siavelis and 
Field 2015, 44-45; Navia 2008). In this respect, different party levels consult and negotiate 
with the party leader, who then takes the final decision (Siavelis and Field 2015, 44-45).  
These two types of vertical integration patterns may, however, generate friction 
between different layers of the party elites, i.e. party candidates/ representatives and the party 
leadership, especially when career prospects of the former clash with party strategic decisions 
made by the party leadership during coalition negotiations. For example, in 2001 internal 
struggles in the PRSD between a group of national representatives and party leader Sule were 
made public, revolving around the bad electoral performance of the PRSD in municipal 
elections and a proposal of fusion with the Partido Por la Democracia (PPD) – another 
member of the Concertación.11 The episode resulted in the suspension of these representatives 
and the party leader and his supporter within the party prevailed.12 In a similar way, a 
dissident group of PRSD representatives publicly questioned the coalition pact supported by 
the party leadership with the Concertación in 2005 and opted for an ideological shift towards 
                                                          
11 See http://www.emol.com/noticias/todas/2001/04/11/51865/consejeros-nacionales-del-prsd-impulsan-fusion-
con-ppd.html, accessed December 1, 2017. 
12 See http://www.emol.com/noticias/todas/2001/02/06/45404/dirigentes-del-prsd-revelan-crisis-al-interior-del-
partido.html, accessed December 1, 2017; http://www.emol.com/noticias/todas/2001/04/17/52393/consejeros-
del-prsd-califican-de-poco-seria-suspension-del-partido.html, accessed December 1, 2017. 
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the centre through supporting the presidential candidate of the Alianza – Sebastian Piñera – 
instead.13 As in 2001, the party leadership – this time under Gómez – prevailed. 
To sum up, the existence of formal and informal institutions of intra- and inter-party 
cooperation, vertically integrating the party overall, secured the survival of the PRSD until the 
present day. The formal procedures of leadership selection legitimize the central elite vis-à-vis 
the party base, providing them with ample autonomy with respect to party strategy. Moreover, 
the informal procedures of candidate selection and the negotiation of coalition pacts secure 
the vertical integration of lower level party officials within an elaborate power-sharing 
context (Siavelis and Field 2015). Nevertheless, the PRSD regularly struggled to retain its 
status as a registered party in Chile and the candidate-centred logic of its electoral survival 
threatens both the stability of the party’s support base as well as decreases the incentives and 
capabilities of central party elites to invest in the development of a routinized party base 
which could contribute to more intra-organizational stability (e.g. Navia 2008; Siavelis and 
Field 2015).  
4.1.2 Australian Greens 
The Australian Greens are a vertically integrated party yet – unlike elite-level routinization – 
base-level routinization has remained limited. The set-up of the party is linked to two main 
factors: first, the party’s social movement roots stressing the importance of permeable, 
participatory organizational structures invite a highly inclusive membership base, keeping 
base-level routinization low. Second, its inception as a bottom-up federation of Green state 
parties14  (some of which had existed on the state level for over 20 years), determined to 
defend their autonomy in the context of the national party organization that led to a strong 
representation of territorial representatives in the national party structure. While the latter 
assures elite integration, this kept the national party (as a layer separate from the state parties) 
until today without effective enforcement capacity and financial autonomy, and with it, 
unable to standardize decision-making procedures or policies across the party organization as 
a whole, in turn, feeding into low base-level routinization. Still today, the majority of state 
                                                          
13 See http://www.emol.com/noticias/nacional/2005/12/19/205313/miembros-del-partido-radical-declaran-su-
apoyo-a-sebastian-pinera.html, accessed December 1, 2017; as well as 
http://www.estrellaarica.cl/prontus4_nots/site/artic/20060105/pags/20060105050617.html, accessed December 
1, 2017. 
14 In Tasmania, New South Wales, Queensland and Western Australia state parties existed prior to the foundation 
of the national party (Miragliotta 2012, 103). 
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parties have maintained traditional structures, hence inclusive and open grass root structures 
with multiple entry points (Miragliotta 2012, 107).15  
Since its formation in 1992, the Greens have strengthened their electoral performance 
and institutional representation and influence significantly.16. After the 2016 federal election, 
however, the party has struggled with various internal tensions related to its structural set-up, 
illustrating the implications of the way the party links elite-level routinization with weak base-
level routinization, a configuration which makes the organization vulnerable to the internal 
diversity of its party base. Before illustrating the resulting patterns of conflict, the nature of 
the integration between the party’s layers deserves a closer look. ‘National’ elites and the 
party base are integrated not through involving the membership base as a whole but through 
the party’s confederate structure, assuring regional representatives’ direct involvement in or 
consultation by the party’s main national organs. The party’s preference for consensus 
decision-making reinforces their position, as it prevents territorial representatives from being 
outvoted. The privileged position of state parties within the national organization also finds 
reflection in their equal representation17 in the party’s main national governance body, the 
National Council, in authority second only to the national party conference. This body is in 
charge of coordinating and organizing policies and operations of the national party and of 
assuring the compliance of state parties (Miragliotta and Jackson 2015, 556-60). Though the 
Parliamentary Party Leader is – as typical in Westminster democracies – selected by members 
of the parliamentary party (Jackson 2011, 192-3), as this ‘parliamentary party’ has been and 
still is predominantly composed of territorial representatives (i.e. state Senators) assures that 
this leader still needs the support of major state officials. Only in 2003, following a structural 
review in 2001, a national Coordinating Group was established (AGCG) – 11 years after the 
party’s foundation – creating an intermediate governing body elected by the national party 
conference rather than being predominantly composed by state delegates. While this group is 
by now a key decision-making organ of the party, decisions are still made in consultation with 
state convenors and state Senators (Jackson 2011, 192). Hence, most of the Greens’ other 
national governance structures are still composed on the basis of state representation 
(Miragliotta and Jackson 2015, 561), maintaining its highly decentralized, confederate 
character. 
                                                          
15 For instance, while the national constitution only recognizes individual party membership, the Victorian 
branch allows for organizational members as well (Miragliotta 2012, 104-5). 
16 In 2010 the party allowed for the formation of a Labour minority government led by Gilard. In 2016 it 
supported the Conservative Turnbull government. 
17 Each state party has two representatives, except their membership exceed 2000 members is case of which the 
state gets one additional delegate (Miragliotta and Jackson 2015, 557). 
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The link between a diverse membership base recruited through distinct state party 
organizations (restricting base-level routinization) and the dominance of territorial 
representation within national party structures (assuring elite-level routinization) reflects in 
the nature of internal conflicts the party had to deal with. Not only has the party suffered from 
the formation of factions. After a disappointing 2016 federal election, a group called “Left 
Renewal” formed within the New South Wales branch around NSW Senator Lee Rhiannon, 
promising to “fight to bring about the end of capitalism”, a development criticized by di 
Natale, the current parliamentary party leader. While the latter invited the group to start their 
own party, Rhiannon stressed the importance of accepting diversity within the party and 
framed the formation of the group as an expression of internal democracy that needs to be 
defended18, reflecting centrifugal tendencies within the organization composed of highly 
autonomous state parties, and national leaders’ limited ability to assure party coherence19. 
This became even clearer in summer 2017 when the national leadership, headed by Di Natale, 
excluded Rhiannon from the party room and demanded an overhaul of the New South Wales 
(NSW) Greens’ constitution, which mandates that its federal representatives adhere to state-
based policy decisions. This move was a response to the public opposition of Rhiannon and 
the NSW Greens to legislation proposed by the federal Liberal-National minority government, 
over which the Greens’ national leadership tried to negotiate a support agreement, which was 
prevented by Rhiannon’s refusal to support the party line. Rather than expelling the senator 
for good, the parliamentary party eventually contained internal conflict in the organization by 
readmitting Rhiannon20, taking the conflict as expression of a “structural issue that needs to be 
addressed”. To be able to handle the tension between the need for group coherence in law-
making and the toleration of diversity in the future, they created a “balance of power 
subcommittee” (BPS) to consider legislation in situations in which the party finds itself in the 
balance of power in the Senate and group members have been instructed by state branches to 
take a conflicting position against national party line. Hence, whenever group members such 
as Rhiannon have the power to block or pass legislation, they can be excluded from the 
                                                          
18 https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/jan/27/the-emergence-of-left-renewal-is-unsurprising-but-
does-it-belong-in-the-greens-party, accessed December 1, 2017; https://www.theguardian.com/australia-
news/2017/jan/27/greens-version-of-tony-abbott-lee-rhiannon-fends-off-bob-brown-attack, accessed December 
1, 2017. 
19http://www.smh.com.au/nsw/australian-greens-national-council-says-factions-incompatible-with-its-principles-
20170129-gu0y7p.html, accessed December 1, 2017; http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/first-
cracks-appear-in-greens-left-renewal-faction/news-story/9352ade488e7b897fcdbe07dac37a681, accessed 
December 1 2017. 
20https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2017/jul/09/nsw-greens-demand-lee-rhiannon-be-fully-reinstated-
to-party-room, accessed December 1, 2017. 
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subcommittee, allowing them to stay loyal to their state parties without preventing the 
national party to negotiate deals with the government.21  
While the Australian Greens as integrated party (elite-level routinization) with a fluid 
support base (weak base-level routinization) has consolidated and become increasingly 
successful and influential over the last decades, this party organization has not only to cope 
with the tensions between more moderate and more radical currents that co-exist within a 
party. Given its set-up, state parties have the constitutionally protected right to choose their 
own strategies of member recruitment and of holding ‘their’ national office-holders to 
account, allowing the latter to oppose the national party line, which the national party had to 
accept as visible in the creation of the “balance of power subcommittee”. Given that state 
constitutions only have to be ‘compatible’ with national rules (Miragliotta 2012, 104), the 
tendencies to such conflict is in-built into the Greens’ basic set-up.  
 
4.2 Base-Level Routinization without Elite-Level Routinization (Type III) 
4.2.1 Partido Justicialista (i.e. Peronist Party) 
The Peronist Party in Argentina (Partido Justicialista, PJ) is one of the oldest parties in the 
Argentine party system. It evolved from its origins as a charismatic party in the 1940s – led 
by Juan Perón – to a decentralized and segmented party with mainly informal roots in 
Argentine society today (Levitsky 2001). Since the beginning of the 1990s the party holds a 
nearly hegemonic position within the party system and different factions of the party held the 
presidency from 1989-1999 (Mememism) and 2003-2015 (Kirchnerism).  
The PJ serves as an ideal example of the Type III routinization pattern, and 
distinguishing between base- and elite-level routinization helps to solve the puzzle the PJ 
posed to party scholars with respect to its level of institutionalization (e.g. Lupu 2015; 
McGuire 1997; Levitsky 2001). Highlighting the difficulties to characterize the degree of 
institutionalization of this party Levitsky, on the one hand, points out that in the PJ “intra-
party rules are widely circumvented, manipulated or contested by Peronist leaders” (1998, 82-
83) suggesting low routinization, which is a characterization that many have taken to describe 
the PJ’s organization overall (e.g. McGuire 1997; De Luca, Jones, and Tula 2002). However, 
on the other hand, Levitsky’s analysis of the PJ also highlights the routinization of base-level 
processes in the party’s decentral and informally organized grassroots infrastructure (Levitsky 
1998; see also Levitsky 2001). These Peronist base units engage in activities such as 
                                                          
21 https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2017/jul/13/greens-allow-lee-rhiannon-to-vote-on-contentious-
laws-subject-to-conditions, accessed December 1, 2017. 
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distribution of food, clothing, and organization of youth activities which serve clientelistic 
ends yet: "these activities entail more than the simple exchange of goods for political support. 
Rather, they are embedded in established and widely shared traditions, roles, language and 
symbols" (Auyero 2000). Consequently, Levitsky characterizes base-level Peronist activity 
“to an important degree” as routinized, with activity in local units being “rooted in widely 
shared norms” and Peronist practices “widely known and remarkably similar across territorial 
units” (1998, 87). Although the Peronist base units are relatively autonomous entities and the 
membership boundaries of the PJ are rather permeable, they nevertheless provide for informal 
regularized interactions between the party and its affiliates and supporters beyond elections 
(Freidenberg and Levitsky 2006, 182-92; Scherlis 2012, 54).  
However, regularized interaction between the party and its base does not impose 
constraints on leadership behavior (Burgess and Levitsky 2003). Although the PJ is organized 
in a decentralized way with powerful local party officials within their subnational territory, 
the party never developed a bureaucratized structure integrating the local party elites into 
national-level decision-making or leadership selection (Wills-Otero 2014; Levitsky 2003). 
Moreover, the party frequently resorted to outside recruitments for high political positions, 
putting people in charge who are not socialized into the organization as followers are and who 
therefore might willingly bypass party rules (De Luca, Jones, and Tula 2002). 
While the main organism of the central party elite is the National Council (according 
to the party statutes), this council lacks the authority to influence decision-making both in and 
outside public institutions (Freidenberg and Levitsky 2006, 187). Instead, decision-making 
usually takes place outside formal party structures and is highly dominated by public 
officeholders (mainly presidents and governors) due to their access to public resources 
necessary to uphold clientelistic networks (e.g. through the use of patronage) (De Luca 2008; 
Freidenberg and Levitsky 2006). Influenced by both the countries federal and presidential 
institutions, in the same way as governors control their Peronist party branches on the 
provincial level, in times when the PJ holds the presidency, the president de facto dominates 
the central party elite and controls the party strategy.22 This explains why “Peronist leaders 
mostly discard the importance of party office and prefer to occupy public office” (Malamud 
                                                          
22 Moreover, presidents have ample gate keeping power with respect to the distribution of public funds (to buy 
off the support of governors) and extensive appointment powers (Scherlis 2012). A systematic analysis of the 
appointment practice during Néstor Kirchner’s presidential term (2003-2007) shows that a PJ party affiliation 
was no relevant criterion in about 55 percent of appointments at the highest political level (Scherlis 2012, 67). 
Moreover, if party affiliation played a role in selecting appointees this was mainly to strategically forge political 
coalitions – a practice Carlos Menem resorted to as well to assure extensive market reforms that even went 
against the core principles of Peronism (i.e. statism and party-union linkages) (see Corrales 2002; Levitsky 
2003). 
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2005, 16). Hence, the selection procedures regulating the election of governors and presidents 
highly influences which actors dominate the provincial or central party elite, respectively. 
With respect to the selection of its presidential candidate, the PJ has never developed an intra-
party routine to select a joint candidate. This lack of intra-party coordination frequently led to 
the open confrontation of different Peronist candidates (each backed by their own clientelistic 
networks) and encouraged the persistence of party factions (De Luca 2008, 197). To resolve 
internal tensions the PJ in several instances allowed opposing factions to run under a split 
ticket with different factions each appealing to their Peronist tradition. The most visible 
instance of this practice took place in the 2003 election when three Peronist factions competed 
against each other in the first-round of the presidential race. Unable to resolve internal 
conflict, a Menemnist faction (with ex-president Carlos Menem as its candidate) ran against a 
faction supporting the candidacy of Adolfo Rodríguez Saá (an ex-interim president) and a 
faction supporting the candidacy of Néstor Kirchner (which later turned into the powerful 
Kirchnerist faction) (De Luca 2008; Levitsky and Murillo 2003). Although this practice 
externalized internal tensions within the party organization it led to a triple split of the 
Peronist vote.23 
To sum up, the leadership selection processes within the PJ follows a patronage-based 
logic, where the success of party elites on the national level depends more on their ability to 
mobilize voters (i.e. control clientelistic networks) and to forge strategic coalitions than to 
serve the party organization (De Luca 2008). This explains why the “party hierarchy is 
extremely porous. It lacks recruitment filters or a central bureaucracy with stable career 
paths” (Burgess and Levitsky 2003, 900; see also De Luca 2008). Moreover, although the PJ 
disposes of a highly routinized party base this party base is not vertically integrated with the 
central party elite – which has considerable discretion with respect to decision-making and to 
modify rules unilaterally (Burgess and Levitsky 2003). Despite the low routinization of the 
central party elite, the PJ has been successful in defending and even expanding is electoral 
advantage within the Argentinean party system. Its highly routinized party base provides the 
decentralized party branches with a powerful tool to mobilize electoral support and although 
different party factions sometimes compete among each other for the presidency, the party 
managed to control the government over 20 years since the return to democracy in 1983. 
 
                                                          
23 Although the three candidates of the PJ combined gained over 60% of the vote, the election resulted in a 
scheduled runoff election between Carlos Menem (24.5%) and Néstor Kirchner (22,2%). Due to the decision of 
Menem to drop out of the second-round race, Néstor Kirchner finally assumed the presidency with less than a 
quarter of the Argentine voters behind his ticket (Levitsky and Murillo 2003). 
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4.2.2 Danish Peoples Party 
The Danish Peoples Party (DPP) was founded in October 1995 by four dissident Progress 
Party MPs – one of them the first party leader Pia Kjærsgaard and at that point lacked a 
working organization. The newly formed party entered the Folketing, the Danish parliament, 
in 1998 with 7.4 per cent of the national vote, and successively increased its electoral support. 
By now it has served repeatedly as support party of Conservative–Liberal minority 
governments. The consolidation of the DPP support base was accompanied by a process of 
organizational institutionalization involving the routinization of its party base. In 1997, the 
DPP had about 1,500 members, in 1998 2,500 and in 2000 over 5,000. In 2009 the party 
membership was reported at about 10,000 (Meret 2010, 98), in 2014 at 14,500 (Christiansen 
2016). To routinize recruitment was a central part of the party’s organization-building efforts, 
especially since the DPP in 1998 had still experienced a shortage of candidates (as is often the 
case with new parties). Looking at the process of member recruitment and candidate 
nomination more closely, from the start the leadership directly controlled the inflow of 
members to assure a basic homogeneity of the party on the ground, establishing – in 1999 – a 
national membership record of all fee-paying members (Zalewski 2005; Pedersen 2006; 
Pedersen and Ringsmose 2004). This was during its first years as support party, when internal 
processes were increasingly guided by organizational procedures – a core indication of 
growing routinization (Panebianco 1988, 49, 53). Initially, the regional and local levels were 
in charge, formally speaking, yet the leadership interfered in selection processes irrespective 
of formal rules (Pedersen and Ringsmose 2004). Nowadays, the centre’s involvement is 
formally recognized which suggests that party processes are more in line with formal rules. 
Every potential candidate has to apply to the national leadership and undergoes a strict 
screening process and the actual lists are put together by the leaders of local branches and one 
member of the national party executive. A complete centralization of decision-making has 
become less essential in face of growing base-level routinization, and the membership 
organization’s ability to filter the pool of possible office aspirants more effectively nowadays 
compared to 1998 when structures were still rudimentary (see for details Bolleyer 2013).  
However, and most importantly for our classification of the DPP as a mixed case 
(although candidate selection processes are inclusive and incorporate the party base in some 
aspects of central leadership decision-making), the main criterion to consider the party elite 
level to be routinized refers to the vertical integration of the party base into (central) 
leadership renewal, which is not given. In this very respect, the DPP remains highly 
leadership dominated as the recent “self-selected” leadership turnover indicates. After 
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building up the party and controlling it since its foundation, in 2012 a DPP press 
announcement of Pia Kjærsgaard’s resignation and Kristian Thulesen Dahl succession was 
released. This succession was a clear case of a ‘coronation’ from within the core central elite 
controlled by the outgoing leader. Kristian Thulesen Dahl has ‘de facto’ been for a long time 
the daily leader of the party and worked closely with Kjærsgaard since the party was founded. 
Indeed Dahl was one of the co-founders of the party. When Kjærsgaard stepped back 
voluntarily after having informed the parliamentary party of her decision earlier on, she 
designated Dahl, one of the party's leading figures, to succeed her. Following this, while 
Kjærsgaard stayed on in parliament, becoming Speaker of Parliament after the 2015 elections 
(Christiansen 2016). The replacement of a long-reigning and uncontested founding leader 
tends to be a major challenge but the party coped well, as visible in significant gains in the 
following local elections as well as the 2015 national election (Meret, Siim, and Pingaud 
2017; Christiansen 2017).  
To date, thanks to its considerable success and the skills of its leadership, the party has 
not shown actual vulnerability as associated with an only base-level routinized party. Until 
her recent succession, Kjærsgaard has effectively dominated the party with the help of a few 
trusted politicians and party bureaucrats, tightly controlling the organization, complemented 
by long-term strategy to build a stable (routinized) support base reducing diversity and 
increasing predictability of the support base and the officials recruited from it. Right from the 
start, Kjærsgaard’s leadership has been hierarchical and strictly sanctioned any public critique 
by followers. An internal rebellion in 2000 is indicative. Complaints in the parliamentary 
group regarding the leadership’s hierarchical decision-making style were answered by the 
expulsion of three MPs and the announcement that publicly articulated critique by any other 
MP or party member would have the same consequences in the future (Pedersen and 
Ringsmose 2004). A Danish newspaper provided estimates that between 1996 and 2006 the 
DPP expelled 30–40 members who spoke out against the party line. This contrasts with the 
Liberals with 3–4 expulsions, the Conservatives with 3–4, the Social Democrats with 2–3, and 
the Unity List with 2 in the same period (Bolleyer 2013). Kjærsgaard’s success in installing a 
capable successor overcame the other major hurdle, to assure leadership continuity within a 
‘self-selected’ elite.   
 
These focussed comparative case studies show us that we can clearly identify political parties 
in both regions which do not conform to the pattern of simultaneous elite- and base-level 
(non)routinization (Type I or Type IV), sketched out in Table 1 above. Instead we are able to 
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identify examples for both mixed configurations in each region. With respect to Type II (elite-
level routinization only), the PRSD in Chile combines a fluctuating and fluid support base – 
activated only at election times for the purpose of retaining the legal party status – dependent 
on highly personalized and candidate-centred local and regional networks, with both formal 
and informal decision-making structures which vertically integrate local party activists and 
party elites into the process of national party leadership selection. The Australian Greens, as 
the second case discussed in this type, combine a very inclusive membership base with 
powerful local party branches which are vertically integrated into the procedures of national 
leadership selection – following a logic of consensus building and elite cooperation across 
different layers of the party. Although both parties are partially routinized, they are prone to 
internal party struggles, often triggered in the context of unpredictable electoral mobilization 
patterns due to either the fluidity or diversity of their party base. 
Turning to the two cases discussed for Type III (base-level routinization only), the 
discussion of the Peronist party in Argentina – according to Levitsky (1998), the case to 
unpack the party institutionalization concept – highlights the feasibility of combining 
regularized albeit informal local party structures, integrating the party base into the 
organization beyond elections with highly centralized and personalized decision-making 
patterns and outside leadership recruitment by national party elites. The Danish Peoples Party, 
on the other hand, combines a formally and exclusively recruited party base with a highly 
dominant national party layer, focussed on the party founder and her cronies. Both parties in 
this type fared far better in electoral competition than the two previously discussed Type II 
cases. However, interestingly the two cases differ with respect to the degree of domination 
national elites’ exercise over other layers within their respective party organization. While the 
PJ is characterized by a high level of elite competition for national public office (including the 
presidency) among different party factions, the DPP is characterized by a high degree of 
vertical domination of the central leadership over its local party branches. In how far this 
mixed-pattern of routinization stabilizes the party organization over time, however, remains to 
be seen. Until recently, both parties benefited from stable electoral support in their respective 
countries, which probably decreased the potential for severe internal conflicts that might 







A considerable body of literature has stressed the importance of party institutionalization.24 
More specifically, it has been argued that institutionalization can contribute to organizational 
stability and party survival and thereby help to stabilize party systems as a whole. Yet as its 
translations into measures has proved challenging, most empirical studies have been either 
qualitative small N studies or, alternatively, have in the context of large-N designs used 
relatively crude proxies such as party age (e.g. Luna 2014; Randall and Svåsand 2002; 
Mainwaring and Scully 1995; Panebianco 1988). Most fundamentally, this article argues that 
before being able to examine the consequences of party institutionalization on a large-scale 
basis, it is essential to arrive at more nuanced measures of the concept.  
Hence, we aim at contributing to the extensive debate about the refinement of the concept of 
party institutionalization.  
We do so by focusing on the multi-level nature of the concept of party 
institutionalization: more specifically, we distinguish the routinization of central party elites 
and the party base. While traditional party models implicitly assume that the routinization of 
central and local party actors develop uniformly, we argue that distinguishing whose behavior 
we actually theorize when we specify and operationalize party routinization helps to reconcile 
contradictions found in the study of party organizations in both old and new democracies 
(Panebianco 1988; Katz and Mair 1995).  
Base-level routinization is defined as the rule-guidedness of the party base (rank-and-
file, subnational activists and party officials), while elite-level routinization is defined as rule 
constraints on current core elites in the area of leadership renewal. We operationalize these 
two aspects through, on the one hand, the presence of permanent local party structures that 
integrate the party base into the party organization (base-level routinization), and on the other, 
the structural involvement of local party actors into the selection of the (central) party 
leadership as one central indication of vertical party integration (elite-level routinization). 
Based on these distinctions, party structures can be conceptualized in four configurations – 
two ‘pure types’ (weak or strong routinization on both dimensions respectively) and two 
‘mixed types’ characterized by either elite-level routinization without the integration of the 
party base into permanent local party structures (Type II), or base-level routinization without 
the vertical integration between this routinized base and  central party elites (Type III). 
                                                          
24 See, for instance, Huntington 1968, Dix 1992, Diamond and Gunther 2001, Randall and Svåsand 2002, 
Freidenberg and Levitsky 2006, Payne 2006, Casal Bértoa 2017. 
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To illustrate the usefulness of this conceptualization and specifically the usefulness of 
‘separating out’ base-level and elite-level routinization, we discussed two examples 
corresponding to each mixed type: Both the Chilean Radical Social Democratic Party and the 
Australian Greens dispose of elite-level routinization – due to the vertical integration of the 
party base in central leadership selection processes – but either deliberately or unwillingly 
failed to build permanent local party structures that integrate the base-level into the party 
organization. In the case of the PRSD formal as well as informal institutions of vertical 
integration help to legitimize the central elite vis-à-vis the party base, the decentralization of 
local and regional activist networks increases the potential of conflict between electorally 
strong party candidates and the central party elite. In the case of the Australian Greens its set-
up as a federation of state party organizations, made the party electorally successful but at the 
same time explains the in-built tensions between different parts of the party and the central 
party elite. In contrast, both the Peronist Party in Argentina and the Danish Peoples Party 
dispose of a routinized party base without structures that vertically integrate this party base 
into leadership selection processes. While in the former, leadership selection remains fluid 
and flexible which allows also for outsider recruitment into the highest ranks of the party 
elite, the latter is characterized (until now) by leadership-dominated self-selection processes. 
 
Three out of the four discussed cases remain remarkably successful electorally over time and 
in organizational terms. Comparing the four cases, hence, highlights that mixed 
configurations of routinization may to some extent can contribute to intra-party organizational 
stability, but less so than we would expect from highly routinized parties that invest in 
building both a routinized party base and a routinized party elite. As the two cases of elite-
routinized parties imply, these parties seem more prone to defections and party-splits as a way 
to resolve intra-party conflicts than parties with a routinized party base providing stronger 
organizational incentives to stick with the party. Moreover, the two cases of base-level 
routinization indicate that integrating the party base into the local organization, and thereby, 
establishing regularized interactions between followers and the party itself, helps to stabilize 
electoral support over time even in the absence of vertical organizational integration between  
party base and elite level. These parties might, over time, may develop into fully routinized 
parties. But as the trajectory of the PJ in Latin America shows, this does not have to be the 
case, which stresses the importance of developing concepts considering the growing 
complexity of party organization in both old and new democracies. 
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A nuanced conceptualization and operationalization of party institutionalization as 
multidimensional concept is especially important if we want to derive causal implications for 
the stability of party support or party systems. Different dimension of this multifaceted 
concept may have different consequences as does the behavior of different party layers. 
Furthermore, focusing on different party actors within party organizations and clarifying 
whose behavior we theorize, enables us to avoid theoretical pitfalls and ambiguities in the 
operationalization of the concept. As indicated in this article, the implications theorized for 
fully routinized political parties may partly also apply to the two newly identified subtypes of 
base-level or elite-level routinization, i.e. the routinization of different party layers. Future 
research on the development and the consequences of party structures will need to factor these 
different layers of party institutionalization into their theories, clarify the level of analysis on 
which they are measured (whose behavior is captured) and aim at testing their impact in large-
N studies as well. Finally, while we focused only on the dimension of routinization in this 
article, the same exercise needs to be done for other dimensions of the concept, like value 
infusion.  
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